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A B S T R A C T
We investigate how airfares respond to changes in the fare of adjacent flights. Using a fixed effects regression on
fares from Amsterdam to Geneva, we find flights that only differ in departure times to be weak substitutes. Fare-
to-fare elasticities for imperfect substitute flights of different airlines are even smaller, implying weak compe-
tition between airlines on this specific route.
If our findings hold for other routes as well, this will have implications for the analysis of price dispersion in
civil aviation. It would imply that demand shocks for individual flights have small effects on prices of other
flights. Demand volatility would then be likely to affect price dispersion on a route level and should be con-
sidered when analyzing price dispersion.
1. Introduction
In the economic literature on civil aviation, flights are commonly
thought of as imperfect substitutes (Alderighi et al., 2015; Basso, 2008;
Borenstein & Netz, 1999; Lijesen & Behrens, 2017). Characteristics that
affect the level of substitution include the (perceived) quality of the
airline, booking restrictions, routing of the flight and time of departure.
We focus on the latter and develop and apply a method to assess the
level of substitutability between flights on the same route.
Understanding the nature of imperfect substitutes and its con-
sequences for pricing is important for several reasons. First, the level of
substitutability partly determines the boundaries of the relevant market
(see e.g. Lijesen & Behrens, 2017), which is valuable information both
for policy makers and for academics looking to assess (changes in) the
level of competition. Second, the level of substitutability has an impact
on price dispersion. If goods are strong substitutes, demand shocks are
more likely to spread over several goods and hence cause smaller price
shocks. Understanding the consequences of substitutability on pricing
can therefore contribute in resolving the long-lasting debate on the
impact of competition on price dispersion (Borenstein & Rose, 1994;
Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai, Liu, & Serfes, 2014; Chandra &
Lederman, 2016, to name but a few influential papers in this debate).
Flights from different airlines are often imperfect substitutes, as the
characteristics of airlines are likely to be different. These differences
range from clearly measurable features such as seat pitch to subjective
judgements about quality. Most authors either use dummy variables (or
fixed effects) for every airline in the analysis or run separate analyses
for each airline. Booking restrictions, such as the Saturday night stay-
over, used to be an important source of product heterogeneity (see e.g.
Stavins, 2001). The importance of these restrictions is decreasing for
short haul flights with the rise of the low-cost carrier business model, as
Alderighi et al. (2015) show.
Routing is also an important product characteristic. It is commonly
assumed that airlines compete on the level of city pairs, although sev-
eral authors distinguish additional factors that should be considered.
Lijesen (2004) shows that indirect flights are imperfect substitutes to
direct flights between the same cities. Many authors (e.g. Dai et al.,
2014; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009) ignore this issue by focusing on direct
flights (and hence ignore the presence of the close substitute) or by
limiting the analysis to flights where indirect flights are hardly a viable
alternative (e.g. Chandra & Lederman, 2016; Lijesen & Behrens, 2017).
Another routing issue is that some cities have multiple airports, or,
more general, that some airports are close enough to be imperfect
substitutes. This issue of competition between nearby airports has been
extensively treated on a case-by-case basis (examples include Jun and
Van Dender, 2009 and Pels, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 2000). Lijesen and
Behrens (2017) analyze the extent to which alternative city- or airport-
pairs impact airline competition and find that the relevant market for a
flight extends well beyond the city-pair level.
The impact of departure time on product homogeneity is implicitly
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present in the spatial competition literature (e.g. Borenstein & Netz,
1999; Salvanes et al., 2005), and the subject is briefly touched upon in
Gaggero, and Piga (2011). Our paper is the first to explicitly study the
impact of departure timing on the level of product homogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
a theoretical framework to explore the implications of price responses,
followed by a translation to our empirical specification. Section 4
provides an overview of the data and we present our empirical results in
section 5. The final section provides conclusions and a discussion.
2. Theoretical framework
Airline pricing is a complex interaction of peak load pricing with
stochastic demand and strategic interactions between competitors.
According to people working in the field, some airlines have highly
advanced pricing schemes, responding to all sorts of changes, whereas
others set fixed fares for certain numbers of chairs (fare buckets). On
some routes, airlines have been observed to match the price of com-
peting flights. All these approaches have in common that a positive
demand shock leads to a price increase for the flight that experiences
the demand shock. Prices of flights on the same route (but different
departure times) are likely to increase as well. This may occur either as
a direct response to the price increase, or as a result of passengers
looking for alternatives for their preferred flight that has now increased
in price.
Consider a market where n imperfect substitutes are supplied. We
assume that the individual supply curve for every good has a strictly
positive slope. The demand for good i can be described by:
=q q p p a( , , )i i i i (1)
where p's reflect prices, and ai denotes an exogenous and independent

















Given the upward sloping supply curve, it is rational to increase the
price of a good in response to an exogenous increase in demand. This in
turn means that an exogenous increase in demand for good i increases
demand for all other goods through the associated price increase.
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reflects the price response of other goods on a price
change in good i. The term ‘response’ intuitively relates to the game
theoretic concept of a best response and is indeed consistent with such a
response in equilibrium. The relationship described by equation (3) is
very general and extends beyond game theoretic interactions.
The mechanism described above can be illustrated by a graph of a
market where two imperfect substitutes are supplied. The graph shows
all curves as linear for ease of interpretation, but this does not drive the
result. The use of demand and supply curves suggest a competitive
market. A similar graphical representation can be made using marginal
costs and marginal benefits curves to cover monopoly and oligopoly
markets.
In practice, we often cannot observe the size of demand shocks or
the slopes of supply and demand curves. Prices, on the other hand, are
often directly observable, especially for goods that are sold online.
Observed prices’ responses provide information on the substitutability
of the goods. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that the level of substitutability
affects the impact of a demand shift of good i on the prices of other
goods. Both from Fig. 1 and from the formal analysis in Appendix A, we
note that the price response is positively related to the level of sub-
stitutability. The steeper (i.e. inelastic) the supply curve is relative to
the demand curve, the more precise the measure is. For perfectly in-
elastic supply (of good j), the price response is a perfect measure of the
level of substitutability.
3. Empirical specification
3.1. Setup and case selection
Flights on a specific itinerary fit our framework quite well; they are
clearly imperfect substitutes and, since capacity is fixed in the short
run, an upward sloping supply curve is ensured. More importantly,
airlines actively adjust prices to changes in demand, and consumers can
observe prices very well, so that all substitutes are taken into account.
In order to identify how departure timing affects the level of product
substitutability, we need to correct for other causes of product homo-
geneity and other substitutes. Rather than trying to take into account
these causes and running the risk of poorly specifying the effects or
incorrectly proxy the characteristics, we choose to select a single route
and analyze the data on the lowest feasible level of aggregation. The
route selection is then based on the lack of importance of other im-
perfect substitutes, that may affect our analysis and lead to a potential
omitted variable bias.
The selected route, Amsterdam-Geneva, fits our purpose very well.
It is a relatively densely travelled route, served by a network carrier
(KLM) and a low-cost carrier (EasyJet). They have both been operating
on this route for many years, without entry or exit of other airlines.
Several flights are available every day, implying that we can observe
several imperfect substitutes. The flying time between Amsterdam and
Geneva varies between 1 h and 30min and 1 h and 40min.
Other imperfect substitutes are relatively unimportant. Travel time
by land modes takes at least four times as long. Several more or less
adjacent flight routes are available; Lyon (98 km from Geneva) is served
from Amsterdam airport and flights depart from Dusseldorf (179 km
from Amsterdam) and Brussels (158 km) to Geneva and Lyon. Based on
the distance decay function and parameter values used by Lijesen and
Behrens (2017), only Amsterdam-Lyon might be a viable alternative.
Due to the geographic situation, the landside travel time from Lyon
airport to Geneva is 1 h and 35min, which is about as long as the flight
time itself. This would hardly count as a reasonable alternative to most
travelers.2 Indirect flights are also available, with total flight times
starting at 3 h and 25min, i.e. twice as long as the direct flight. This,
again, will not be considered by the majority of travelers.
3.2. Empirical specification




, as used in equation (3)
in section 2. As Fig. 1 suggests, this value provides information on the
level of substitutability of two goods. It measures the price impact of a
demand shock on good i on the prices of other goods relative to the
effect on the price of good i itself. Demand for flights from a specific
carrier on a specific time of day is often quite volatile, i.e. many de-
mand shifts occur. The demand shifts are not observed, but price
1 Note that the assumption of independent demand shocks might not always
hold, as demand shocks may stretch out over a longer period of time, e.g. be-
cause of a longer lasting event. We expect positive dependence to be more likely
in practice than negative dependence. In that case our results provide an
overestimation of the actual substitutability, implying that our qualitative
conclusions still hold.
2 Apart from additional travel time, passengers would also have the additional
costs of having to rent a car. Public transport options are much slower, with the
exception of the direct Oui-connection, which has a frequency of 1 per day.
Geneva airport on the other hand has a frequent 7-min connection to the city.
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responses are, and they form the backbone of our empirical analysis.
Apart from price responses, we need to take several other aspects into
account. First of all, we need to account for flights being sold out.
Second, we need to correct for all observable factors that affect airfares
in order to estimate the relationship between fares with as little bias as
possible.
If a flight is sold out, we no longer observe its price, but the fact that
it is sold out can be observed.3 If a flight is sold out, two remarks are in
order. First, the demand for the sold-out flight was high, implying that
(unobserved) prices for the last few seats were probably high. Second,
the flight is no longer for sale, implying that close substitutes gain
market power. Both effects lead to a higher price for close substitutes.
We add sold-out dummies for adjacent flights to capture the effect on
fare.
Numerous research papers have tried to pinpoint the factors that are
responsible for differences in airfares. The time between booking and
departure is consistently shown to impact air fare levels (see e.g.
Bilotkach, Gorodnichenko, & Talavera, 2010; Button & Vega, 2010; Pels
& Rietveld, 2004; Piga & Bachis, 2007). We therefore add this variable
to our analysis as well. Moreover, we use a fixed effects estimation, at
the level of individual flights (i.e. the combination flight number and
date), thus capturing all differences in fare levels between individual
flights.
The considerations above lead to the following equation to be es-
timated, where we use a log-log transformation in order to be able to
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Where subscripts i denote individual flights, operated either by airline j
or airline –j. P's, both in variable names and parameter subscripts, relate
to prices, and similarly S's denote that a flight is sold out. The sum-
mations over x denote the six flights departing before and after flight i,
for both airlines and dtd is a counter for the number of days to de-
parture.4 Fixed effects are captured in εi, and εi,j,t is a normally dis-
tributed error term with zero mean.5
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of a positive demand shock.
3 Sold out flights are reported as sold out on EasyJet's website, but not on
KLM's website. However, by comparing the schedule and flights on offer, a sold-
out KLM-flight can still be identified.
4 Six flights earlier and later implies 24 h earlier and later for KLM. EasyJet
has a lower frequency on the route and hence the time span is a bit longer.
5 Our theoretical framework is based on a demand shock for one good. If
multiple demand shocks occur at the same time, it would matter whether these
shocks are systematically related or not. If not, the error term captures the effect
of the flight's own demand shock on the flight's price and the response to de-
mand shocks on other flights are captured in the alphas in equation (4). In that
case, the alphas are unbiased parameters. Only if demand shocks are system-
atically related, a bias might occur. See footnote 1 for a further discussion.
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4. Data
We apply the framework above to the airline route Amsterdam –
Geneva. Airfare data were collected from booking sites on a daily basis
between February 14, 2017 and May 30, 2017 within the time interval
of 10 p.m. and midnight. We collected single trip fares to avoid any
influence of booking restrictions. Data were recorded for all flights
departing between February 15, 2017 and May 31, 2017. A unique
flight number is assigned to every flight observed, running in chron-
ological order.6 Note that this is not the same as a flight number as-
signed by an airline (which is only unique on a given day). Every un-
ique combination of a specific flight and a specific collection date make
an observation. Each observation contains information on the airline,
the observation date, the departure date, departure time and day of the
week and the price of the ticket. Table 1 below shows descriptive sta-
tistics for the economy class airfare by airline and departure day.
The number of observations per day for KLM ranges between 4525
for Fridays and 5097 for Wednesdays and for EasyJet between 1547
(Sundays) and 2963 (Fridays). These differences reflect the differences
in both the number of flights (6 per day for KLM, and 2 to 4 per day for
EasyJet) and the number of sold out flights. The observations by de-
parture time are grouped for EasyJet, as they don't fly on the exact same
time every day. The mean fare of all days and departure times is higher
than the median fare, hinting at a skewness to the right, which is
consistent with prices increasing steeply once capacity is nearly
reached. Flights on Mondays and Sundays are notably more expensive
than midweek flights for both airlines (indicating higher willingness to
pay when nearing the work week), and Saturdays are in between. Fare
differences by departure time are smaller than those by day of the week
and do not show any obvious pattern. Overall, average and median
fares are considerably lower for EasyJet than for KLM.
Based on the raw dataset, we constructed variables relating the
flights to each other, such as the airfare for the previous 6 and next 6
flights of both airlines, a sold-out dummy variable (again for the pre-
vious 6 and next 6 flights of both airlines), the number of days to de-
parture and dummy variables for all weekdays, departure times and
months. Ultimately, the data set contained 31,745 observations for KLM
and 13,476 observations for EasyJet flights and 155 variables.
5. Empirical results
Table 2 below presents the results of the empirical analysis for both
airlines. Since both the dependent variable and the independent price
variables are in logs, the parameters can be interpreted as elasticities.
The overall picture that emerges is that prices are positively related for
adjacent (in terms of departure time) flights, with the effect being
stronger for flights of the same airline. Both make sense in terms of our
theoretical framework, as both the different departure times and the
airlines' perceived quality are expected to increase the difference be-
tween the goods. The effect of adjacent prices is nearly symmetric,
especially for flights of the same airline. The effect decreases if flights
are further away, indicating that flights become closer substitutes if
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of fares by airline, day of departure and departure time.
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
KLM, N 4779 4980 5097 4529 4525 4630 4593
Mean 207 160 155 164 161 192 257
Median 137 108 97 97 98 110 220
Sd 146 116 113 124 119 152 164
Min 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Max 660 660 660 660 660 660 660
EasyJet, N 2398 1667 1701 2264 2963 1569 1547
Mean 109 68 62 73 71 79 179
Median 101 63 50 60 56 69 161
Sd 49 28 30 39 40 39 61
Min 35 35 33 34 34 33 69
Max 307 230 273 312 332 246 430
7:00 9:40 12:20 15:15 17:10 21:00
KLM, N 5589 5483 5532 5477 5505 5547
Mean 162 189 187 170 205 196
Median 98 112 108 98 135 111
Sd 119 138 144 122 153 148
Min 96 96 96 96 96 96
Max 660 660 660 660 660 660
7:25–7:30 8:45–9:00 13:35–14:20 14:45–15:20 17:20–17:40 18:45 20:35–21:30
EasyJet, N 2657 647 742 2812 4007 657 2587
Mean 79 61 103 90 83 66 117
Median 67 56 91 65 69 57 106
Sd 42 23 42 64 46 34 68
Min 34 35 50 33 35 35 35
Max 332 137 242 430 312 192 398
6 The first departing EasyJet flight on February 15, 2017 was assigned
number 1 whereas the last EasyJet flight on May 31, 2017 was assigned number
266, thus accounting for 266 EasyJet flights in that time frame on that route. In
the same time frame KLM had 632 flights, thus numbered 1 to 632.
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departure times are closer and vice versa. The impact of KLM's +6 and
−6 flights on KLM's own flight are rather strongly positive. These are
flights that fly exactly 24 h earlier or later. This might suggest that, for
some travelers, departing a day earlier or later on the same time of day
may be a better option than departing on a different time of day on the
same day.
For ease of interpretation, we plot the parameters against the time
difference between flights in Fig. 2. The general image that emerges
shows that KLM flights affect other KLM fights that differ up to 12 h in
departure time. The impact holds both for fares and for sold-out flights
and decreases rather rapidly if the difference in departure times in-
creases. The impact of EasyJet fares and sold-out flights on KLM's fares
is rather obvious (and similar in size) for the flights directly adjacent,
but the picture becomes less clear for flights further apart. Similar
findings hold for the impact on EasyJet's fares. The main difference
between the left-hand side and right-hand side of the figure is that the
impact of EasyJet's own fares and sold-out flights seems to spread out
over a longer period of time. It is not clear from our results whether this
is caused by the difference in timing of flights or by something else.7
Our results show that the price of a flight responds to nearby flights,
but less so to flights further apart timewise. Moreover, the response to
fares of own flights is stronger than the response to flights of the other
airline. The latter makes perfect sense, as KLM and EasyJet can be
considered as imperfect substitutes, regardless of their departure times.
Our results are remarkably –although not perfectly- symmetric in terms
of earlier versus later flights. The response to other flights being sold
out, roughly follows the same patterns.
The strongest price responses in our results are below 0.25, which is
low compared to an expected value of unity for perfect substitutes. This
suggests that departure time is likely to be a strong driver of product
heterogeneity and that two otherwise exactly similar flights can be
weak substitutes by their departure time alone.
6. Conclusions and discussion
We have empirically established how the fares of flights (on the
route Amsterdam to Geneva) respond to changes in the fares of earlier
and later flights. These fares are related, but the price-to-price elasti-
cities do not exceed 0.25, suggesting that adjacent flights are rather
weak substitutes. The elasticities for adjacent flights of different airlines
are even smaller, implying that competition between airlines is rather
weak, even if they offer very similar flights.
Our findings (on this route) suggest that the traditional view that
two airlines operating on the exact same route engage in strong com-
petition, needs rethinking. Price responses to price changes of other
airlines are very low, and even price responses to a competitor's flight
selling out are rather limited. This suggests that, on the route analyzed
in this paper, airlines have quite some freedom in setting fares without
provoking a competitive response.
Moreover, our findings may have implications for the ongoing de-
bate on price dispersion in civil aviation and its relationship with
competition. Our results suggest that arbitrage between flights (even of
the same airline) is limited on the route investigated in this paper. If
this holds for other routes as well, it implies that demand shocks at the
level of individual flights can cause strong price responses that only
partly spread over to other flights. Given that price dispersion is often
measured at the airline-route level, this implies two things. First, de-
mand shocks for individual flights contribute to price dispersion and are
not arbitraged away easily. Secondly, flights with differently valued
departure times (but similar capacity) cause price dispersion between
flights of the same airline, even if no demand shocks occur. The above
implies that to fully understand and correctly analyze price dispersion,
researchers may also want to consider measures for demand volatility
and the presence of flights leaving on different (more or less popular)
times of the day.
We note that our empirical analysis is based on a single city pair.
Table 2
Fixed effect regression result for ln(price).
ln(price) KLM ln(price) EZY
Parameter Std error Parameter Std error
Days to Departure −0.001*** −0.0001 −0.0002** −0.0001
ln(price) of other flights
KLM-6 0.088*** 0.005 −0.024*** −0.005
KLM-5 0.028*** 0.006 0.020*** 0.006
KLM-4 −0.037*** −0.005 0.025*** 0.006
KLM-3 0.044*** 0.006 −0.025*** −0.006
KLM-2 0.092*** 0.006 −0.004 −0.006
KLM-1 0.233*** 0.005 0.042*** 0.006
KLM+1 0.242*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.006
KLM+2 0.096*** 0.006 −0.022*** −0.006
KLM+3 0.047*** 0.006 0.019*** 0.005
KLM+4 −0.029*** −0.006 0.040*** 0.006
KLM+5 0.033*** 0.006 0.009 0.006
KLM+6 0.090*** 0.005 −0.033*** −0.005
EZY-6 0.013* 0.007 0.013* 0.007
EZY-5 −0.020** −0.008 0.043*** 0.008
EZY-4 −0.005 −0.008 0.014* 0.008
EZY-3 −0.020** −0.008 −0.001 −0.008
EZY-2 0.023*** 0.008 0.091*** 0.008
EZY-1 0.028*** 0.008 0.228*** 0.008
EZY+1 0.051*** 0.008 0.229*** 0.008
EZY+2 −0.025*** −0.008 0.096*** 0.009
EZY+3 0.014 0.009 −0.019** −0.009
EZY+4 0.001 0.009 0.015* 0.009
EZY+5 0.021** 0.009 0.047*** 0.009
EZY+6 −0.003 −0.009 0.025*** 0.008
Other flights sold out
KLM-6 0.550*** 0.033 −0.174*** −0.032
KLM-5 0.225*** 0.036 0.118*** 0.039
KLM-4 −0.209*** −0.036 0.120*** 0.038
KLM-3 0.275*** 0.036 −0.141*** −0.04
KLM-2 0.569*** 0.036 −0.046 −0.036
KLM-1 1.492*** 0.036 0.231*** 0.038
KLM+1 1.572*** 0.036 0.157*** 0.038
KLM+2 0.597*** 0.037 −0.111*** −0.037
KLM+3 0.268*** 0.037 0.097*** 0.036
KLM+4 −0.261*** 0.037 0.341*** 0.038
KLM+5 0.302*** 0.037 0.018 0.039
KLM+6 0.548*** 0.035 −0.223*** −0.036
EZY-6 0.063 0.038 0.092** 0.039
EZY-5 −0.069 −0.043 0.240*** 0.043
EZY-4 −0.07 −0.044 0.093** 0.044
EZY-3 −0.098** −0.045 −0.03 −0.045
EZY-2 0.075* 0.045 0.457*** 0.045
EZY-1 0.179*** 0.044 1.250*** 0.044
EZY+1 0.295*** 0.046 1.234*** 0.047
EZY+2 −0.177*** −0.047 0.496*** 0.048
EZY+3 0.043 0.047 −0.126*** −0.048
EZY+4 −0.042 0.049 0.157*** 0.048
EZY+5 0.131*** 0.049 0.226*** 0.049
EZY+6 0.002 0.049 0.095** 0.047
Observations 31,745 13,476
Adjusted R2 0.723 0.566
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
7 One would expect closer flights to be stronger substitutes and hence that
elasticities decrease when flights are further apart, which is exactly what we
find. Given this finding, there seems to be no merit to looking at flights that are
even further apart.
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Obviously, other city pairs may provide different results, and future
research should certainly focus on identifying and explaining these
differences. One can imagine that substitutability depends on factors
like the share of business travelers, as these are more likely to value
specific arrival times. Moreover, it would be interesting to see whether
firms respond stronger to each other if the airlines competing on that
route are more similar (e.g. both low cost airlines or both network
carriers).
Appendix A. Relationship between price response and substitutability
Consider a situation where two imperfect substitutes (i and j) are offered. Both goods have a downward sloping demand curve and an upward
sloping supply curve. We start from the observation that the price of good i has increased as a result of some exogenous development.















is the (local) slope of the demand for good j with respect to the price of good i and dqj
D is the shift of the demand curve of good j (as a
function of good j, as depicted in the lower left quadrant of Fig. 1).8 The shift of demand curve leads to a smaller (or equal if demand is inelastic)



































From (A.3), we can calculate the price change:
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of parameters by difference in departure time (hours).
8 We use linear slopes throughout this analysis, assuming that changes are sufficiently small to approximate the effect by a local linearization of the slopes.




































































































































(A.6) shows that the price response is positively related to the level of substitutability. The steeper (i.e. inelastic) the supply curve is relative to the
demand curve, the more precise the measure is. For perfectly inelastic supply, the price response is a perfect measure of the level of substitutability.
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